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Contrasting legal solutions 
and the comparability of EU and US experiences 
 
Pierre Larouche* 
 
In the broad area of economic regulation, comprising general competition/antitrust 
law as well as sectoral regulation, ideas flow very easily and very extensively across 
the Atlantic, with the USA remaining the center of gravity, however. 
 
This free flow of ideas is stimulated by a broadly shared willingness to base economic 
regulation on economic analysis. Economics is meant to be unique, i.e. applicable in a 
variety of specific national contexts without losing its universality. On the other hand, 
lawyers typically like to point out at differences between the legal systems – and more 
broadly, alleged differences in “legal culture” – to argue for diverging solutions. 
These claims are also often exaggerated, and indeed recourse to economic analysis 
helps to debunk them. Nevertheless, in some cases, legitimate legal differences 
between the EC and the US on matters of economic regulation might affect the 
universal applicability of economic science. 
 
By way of illustration of the above, this paper examines two specific issues relating to 
competition law and telecommunications regulation: 
 
(I) the hierarchy in the application of competition law and sector-specific 
regulation: the US Supreme Court decision in Trinko and the Commission 
decision in the Deutsche Telekom price squeeze case evidence two different 
approaches; 
 
(II) the principle of technological neutrality and the place of competition law 
principles in sector-specific regulation: here the approach of the FCC under 
the Communications Act can be compared with that of the Commission under 
the new electronic communications framework. 
 
I. THE HIERARCHY BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW AND REGULATION 
 
In the USA as in the EU, network industries such as telecommunications, post, 
energy, etc. are typically seen as “regulated” industries, meaning that they are subject 
to a set of regulation specifically designed for the industry in question (so-called 
“sector-specific regulation”. At the same time, the firms in these industries typically 
fulfill the basic conditions for competition law to be applicable to them.1 
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A. Background 
 
Given the potential applicability of two regulatory frameworks, one general and one 
specific, their relationship, in particular the hierarchy between the two, becomes a key 
issue, for both substantive and procedural reasons. 
 
With respect to substance, on the assumption that there is overlap between the two 
frameworks (more on this below), it seems desirable to avoid conflicting decisions by 
authorities within the same jurisdiction. “Conflicting decisions” are to be understood 
as a situation where a single firm would be the addressee of two incompatible 
decisions – for instance, one which would authorise a certain course of action, and the 
other which would prohibit it – which are both applicable at the same location and at 
the same time.2 Beyond the confines of this definition (i.e. where the two decisions 
are not entirely incompatible or where they emanate from different jurisdictions), it is 
less clear that coordination should be sought: lawyers tend to overemphasize 
uniformity and consistency and often ignore the advantages of maintaining some form 
of “regulatory competition” writ large.3 Indeed, in a context of uncertainty and change 
– as is evidenced especially in the converged telecommunications, IT and media 
sector – it might be preferable to experiment with regulatory solutions and engage 
into “learning-by-doing” across jurisdictions, even at the expense of some legal 
certainty. Nevertheless, the potential for conflicting decisions and the need for 
coordination are stronger across regulatory frameworks than within individual 
frameworks. 
 
With respect to procedure, again on the assumption that there is overlap between 
competition law and regulation, having two or more authorities to choose from might 
be a blessing to a given plaintiff or complainant, and on the aggregate it might thus 
contribute to put more pressure on the defendant (often the incumbent) to comply. 
Such an advantage is transitory, and as the law moves away from a newcomer vs. 
incumbent pattern (when liberalization starts to take hold), that advantage is overcome 
by the risk of substantive conflict (mentioned above), excessive enforcement (each 
authority wanting to justify its existence) or procedural delays. 
 
In the light of the above, we now examine how the USA and the EU deal with the 
relationship between the competition law and regulatory frameworks. Interestingly 
enough, within the space of a few months in 2003-2004, two cases dealt with that 
issue, namely the Commission decision in Deutsche Telekom (Price Squeeze)4 and the 
US Supreme Court judgment in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of 
Curtis V. Trinko.5 These two cases will be used as a basis for the comparison between 
the US and EU approaches to the relationship between competition law and 
regulation. 
 
B. The Supreme Court judgment in Trinko 
 
In Trinko, the defendant Verizon Communications had been the subject of 
enforcement action under sector-specific regulation (the Telecommunications Act 
1996) concerning its failure to comply with the requirement to give its competitors 
access to its Operations Support Systems (OSS) (47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3)), which was 
also part of the “checklist” of requirements to be complied with before a LEC could 
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venture into long-distance (47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)). Following some complaints, 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) intervened to obtain additional 
commitments from Verizon (in a consent decree).6 The day after the consent decree 
was entered, Trinko, a client of a competitor of Verizon, filed a class action against 
Verizon, alleging among others a breach of § 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 2), in 
that Verizon failed to give competitors access to its OSS systems (the very issue 
which had given rise to the intervention of the FCC). The case found its way to the 
US Supreme Court. 
 
The Supreme Court opinion in Trinko is remarkable in many ways. On the substance 
of the case, the Supreme Court confirms the restrictive attitude of US law towards the 
use of competition law to impose duties to deal upon dominant firms. This has been a 
standard feature of US law ever since the Colgate decision in 1919.7 Since then, only 
in comparatively few cases has a duty to deal been imposed by US courts. In Trinko, 
the majority gives a restrictive reading to the most relevant of these few cases, Aspen 
Skiing,8 characterizing it as falling “at or near the outer boundary of § 2 liability”. 
According to the Trinko court, Aspen Skiing is restricted to cases where the refusal to 
deal concerned a service which was already offered by the dominant firm to others; in 
contrast, § 2 of the Sherman Act cannot be used to compel a dominant firm to offer to 
competitors a service which is currently not offered at all to anyone. The court also 
takes the opportunity once more to leave in limbo the “essential facilities” doctrine 
which had been crafted by lower courts, by refusing to either confirm or deny its 
existence. 
 
The most interesting part of Trinko for our purposes is the discussion of the 
relationship between competition law and sector-specific regulation. At issue before 
the Court is whether the regulatory duties introduced by the Telecommunications Act 
1996 can also support a claim under competition law. According to the Court, the 
wide-ranging nature of the Telecommunications Act would rather lead to the opposite 
conclusion, namely that it was intended to be a stand-alone regulatory regime, and 
that hence that the firms subject to that regime would be immune from competition 
law (“implied immunity” doctrine). The aim of that doctrine is to avoid regulatory 
decisions being frustrated by conflicting decisions under competition law. As the 
Court notes, however, the Telecommunications Act 1996 expressly leaves 
competition law applicable, which excludes any “implied immunity”.9  
 
Since as noted before the current interpretation of § 2 of the Sherman Act does not 
support the claim of the plaintiff, the Court then examines whether the 
Telecommunications Act 1996 would not in and of itself justify making an exception 
to the abovementioned Colgate doctrine (according to which dominant firms have no 
duty to deal with competitors). To some extent, this is a re-run of the “implied 
immunity” argument, which the Court could not entertain because of the explicit text 
of the Telecommunications Act. The core of the Court’s reasoning is found at p. 696: 
 
“One factor of particular importance is the existence of a regulatory structure 
designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm. Where such a structure 
exists, the additional benefit to competition provided by antitrust enforcement 
will tend to be small, and it will be less plausible that the antitrust laws 
contemplate such additional scrutiny. Where, by contrast, ‘[t]here is nothing 
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built into the regulatory scheme which performs the antitrust function,’10 the 
benefits of antitrust are worth its sometimes considerable disadvantages.” 
 
Applying these principles to the facts, the Court finds that the Telecommunications 
Act 1996 contains quite an elaborate set of substantive and procedural provisions 
which made it “an effective steward of the antitrust function”.11 When the risk of false 
positives in using competition law in such complex settings and the need for ongoing 
monitoring of remedies are put in the balance, then it must be concluded that using 
competition law on top of regulation would deliver no added value and could even be 
counter-productive. 
 
C. The Commission decision in DT 
 
The Commission decision in DT started from a similar factual background. Since 
1997, under German law (originally) and later on under EC law as well,12 DT is under 
an obligation to provide an unbundled local loop offering to its competitors.13 The 
tariffs for that offering must be cost-oriented, and the National Regulatory Authority 
(NRA) – at that time the Regulierungsbehörde für Telekommunikation und Post 
(RegTP)14 – must approve the tariffs. 
 
At the same time, the retail tariffs of DT were subject to a price-cap system under 
German law, at least as far as PSTN and ISDN subscriptions were concerned.15 A first 
system, based on regulated baskets of services, was in force until the end of 2001. As 
of 2002, it was replaced by RPI-x price-cap regulation. Normally, the retail tariffs of 
DT should have been completely rebalanced when the German market was fully 
liberalized in 1998; 16 beforehand, as was customary in Europe, the access tariffs 
(monthly subscription) were loss-making whilst the call charges were profit-making. 
Unfortunately, rebalancing was not yet complete at the time when the unbundled local 
loop offering was introduced.  
 
The overall regulatory picture was therefore as follows: 
- at the wholesale level, the RegTP had approved a series of tariffs for the 
unbundled local loop which were meant to be cost-oriented; 
- at the retail level, the RegTP had introduced a price-cap system, where the 
starting point (the original tariffs) was sometimes below cost, for historical 
reasons.17 
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to review the various assessment formula put 
forward by the parties and the Commission in this case,18 but under certain 
circumstances, a comparison between the approved wholesale and retail tariffs 
actually resulted in a negative margin for competitors, or a very small positive 
margin, thus leading to complaints of margin squeeze under Article 82 EC. 
 
In DT, the Commission dealt with these complaints. It identified relevant product 
markets for wholesale access (unbundled local loop) and for retail access (one-off 
connection and monthly subscription), the latter being split between narrowband and 
broadband access,19 the relevant geographical market being Germany.20 Deutsche 
Telekom was found dominant on these markets.21 After dealing with a number of 
controversial methodological issues, the Commission ended up finding that DT had 
indeed engaged into margin squeeze22 and imposed a moderate fine on DT, given that 
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this was the first case where the Commission used this specific method to assess 
margin squeeze.23  
 
Much like Trinko, DT also raises the issue of the relationship between regulation and 
competition law, since DT claimed to have relied on regulatory approvals in assuming 
that its pricing practices were permissible. The Commission began by restating that 
DT was an undertaking within the meaning of EC competition law, meaning that it 
fell within the ambit of EC competition law rationae personae.24 As long as DT 
retained some autonomy, its behaviour could still infringe Articles 81 and 82 EC: 
“competition rules may apply where the sector-specific legislation does not preclude 
the undertakings it governs from engaging in autonomous conduct that prevents, 
restricts or distorts competition”.25  
 
According to the Commission, whilst DT had no autonomy as regards wholesale ULL 
tariffs, which were fixed by the RegTP, DT still had some room for autonomous 
action with respect to retail access tariffs. It could thus have sought to increase its 
retail subscription rates (in parallel with a reduction in call charges) so as to remove 
the margin squeeze. How DT could have done that depended on the details of the 
German regulatory framework. Under the price-cap system in force until the end of 
2001, DT could have applied to the RegTP for an upwards adjustment in its monthy 
subscription tariffs (within the regulated basket).26 This was all the more necessary 
since DT had otherwise applied for a reduction in the call charges; in the words of the 
Commission, “an increase in [DT’s] monthly and/or one-off charges for retail access 
was not only economically feasible but, in view of the margin squeeze, a legal 
requirement, provided that there was no breach of the price cap provisions in force” 
[our emphasis].27 Under the new price-cap system in force since 2002, given the 
negative X-factor applied to monthy subscription tariffs, DT had leeway to increase 
them.28 Finally, as regards the monthly subscription rates for ADSL, there was no 
retail regulation and DT was free at all times to raise its retail prices to remove the 
margin squeeze.29 The Commission therefore concluded that DT had room for 
autonomous conduct, and that it used this room to abuse its dominant position. The 
fact that both wholesale and retail prices were regulated did give DT some reprieve, 
but only at the fining stage, where it led the Commission to apply a 10% discount.30 
 
D. Analysis of the different approaches 
 
These two cases are the most recent and authoritative pronouncements on the 
relationship between competition law and regulation in the USA and the EU 
respectively. 
 
The starting point in both cases is similar: competition law and regulation co-exist, 
and the application of sector-specific regulation does not as such exclude that 
competition law might also be applicable. 
 
Beyond that common starting point, however, the two cases veer in separate 
directions. 
 
In Trinko, it is apparent that the Supreme Court seeks to avoid the simultaneous 
application of both regimes. Indeed, the assumption underlying the opinion of the 
Court is that sector-specific regulatory regimes are usually so complete that they take 
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care of the whole of market regulation for the sector in question and thus also perform 
the “antitrust function”. In such a case, competition law will yield to sector-specific 
regulation. This is translated into the doctrine of “implied immunity”, which the Court 
could not apply to quickly deal with Trinko, given the text of the Telecommunications 
Act 1996, which explicitly kept competition law applicable. Even then, the Court 
refuses to apply competition law to the case, arguing that § 2 of the Sherman Act 
would not apply on the facts of Trinko and that the Telecommunications Act 1996 
offers no basis to introduce a new exception to the Colgate rule that dominant firms 
are under no duty to deal with competitors. The end-result is thus that competition law 
is kept away from a case where regulation was already applied. 
 
In contrast, in DT, the European Commission purposedly applied competition law 
even though the case had been dealt with under German regulation (itself based on EC 
instruments). 
 
In the following paragraphs, we explore a number of possible explanations for that 
difference between US and EC law. 
 
1. Case-specific explanations 
 
First of all, some peculiarities of the DT case – as compared to Trinko – could explain 
the different result.31 Whilst in Trinko it seemed that the action of the FCC (and the 
New York PSC) has produced a desirable outcome, in DT at first sight it looks as if 
the RegTP was unable to tackle an obvious problem.32 Indeed the RegTP had 
approved wholesale ULL tariffs which were higher than the retail tariffs for monthly 
subscription to DT’s PSTN/ISDN network, which were also subject to regulatory 
control, seemingly putting competitors in an impossible situation where they face a 
negative spread between wholesale and retail prices. That would thus constitute a 
failure of the “antitrust function” of regulation under the Trinko rationale.33 However, 
as the length and windedness of the Commission decision show, the case is not so 
simple, and there were also good arguments why the margin squeeze test used by the 
Commission is not correct (for instance, it artificially splits monthly subscription from 
call charges). So that explanation cannot alone account for the difference between DT 
and Trinko as to the relationship between competition law and regulation. 
 
A second case-specific explanation would involve presenting DT as an aberration 
which cannot have the same precedential value as a Supreme Court decision such as 
Trinko. Indeed, to some extent, the Commission in DT punished Deutsche Telekom 
for the sins of the German authorities. Given that wholesale ULL tariffs were 
regulated on a cost-oriented basis, the source of the margin squeeze is obviously to be 
found in too low retail tariffs; those had remained low because Germany had failed to 
carry out tariff rebalancing ahead of liberalization in 1998, in breach of its obligations 
under Directive 90/388.34 Accordingly, the Commission should have opened an 
infringement procedure under Article 226 EC against Germany and not a competition 
law case against DT.35 Even if another recourse might have been preferrable and 
actually more attuned to the real source of the problem, this does not necessarily turn 
DT into a freak case. 
 
2. Fundamental explanations 
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Rather, one should assume that DT is also an authoritative decision which evidences 
that the relationship between competition law and sector-specific regulation is 
different under EC than under US law. One must then look for more fundamental 
differences. 
 
a. Substance of competition law 
 
As a first hypothesis, the difference could be due to divergences in substantive 
competition law. After all, the US Supreme Court made it clear that it did not see how 
Trinko could give rise to a claim under § 2 of the Sherman Act, given the Colgate line 
of case-law. The Commission, on the other hand, did not see any difficulty in 
applying Article 82 EC to what it perceived as a case of margin squeeze in DT. In 
general, indeed, EC competition law has been expanded to cover most of the major 
regulatory issues, among others via the so-called “essential facilities doctrine” (in 
access cases), the non-discrimination principle (broadened to include intra-firm 
dealings) or closer attention to pricing issues (including cross-subsidization, predatory 
pricing, price squeeze, etc.).36 This substantive overlap between competition law and 
regulation in the EC might explain the greater willingness to apply competition law 
on top of regulation.37 At the same time, the last part of the majority opinion in Trinko 
appears to admit that the presence of regulation could influence the interpretation of 
competition law and thus lead to a situation where competition law would apply in 
addition to regulation. The differences in the substantive coverage of US and EC 
competition law would therefore not suffice to explain Trinko and DT. 
 
b. Regulatory policy and economics 
 
A second hypothesis would put the explanation more at the level of regulatory policy 
and economics. The opinion of the Supreme Court reveals two rationales for keeping 
competition law out of the realm of regulation. A first rationale turns around what the 
Court terms the risk of “false positives”, namely that competition law would be used 
to intervene in a case where there should have been no intervention (and where indeed 
the application of regulation did not result in intervention). This comes close to a 
“double jeopardy” rationale: a firm which has already had to go through the 
regulatory process should not be subjected again to close scrutiny, this time under the 
guise of competition law. “False positives” are thus undesirable as such, and 
moreover they also send the wrong signal to other firms, namely that excessive 
intervention is to be expected.  A second rationale is that courts acting on the basis of 
competition law are unlikely to be able to exert the kind of control which is necessary 
to implement the type of obligations arising out of regulation (especially an ex nihil 
access obligation such as in Trinko). Using competition law is thus likely to be 
ineffective and bring limited added value (if at all). 
 
One might wonder why the Commission would not share that view. Actually, it 
probably does. However, other factors are also at play. As concerns the second 
rationale (ineffectiveness of intervention under competition law), the same 
argumentation is also made in the EC.38 Yet enforcement of competition law is carried 
out primarily by the Commission and national competition authorities (NCAs), as 
opposed to national courts.39 The Commission and NCAs, when applying competition 
law, are perhaps not as well equipped as NRAs in terms of expertise and resources, 
EC and US: contrasting legal solutions and comparability Pierre Larouche 
 8 
but they are still better placed than courts. They can handle more difficult issues 
falling in the intersection between competition law and regulation.40 
 
As for the first rationale (risk of false positives), it is addressed in DT in a somewhat 
roundabout and disingenuous way. The Commission must answer DT’s argument that 
it is revisiting and second-guessing the work of RegTP. It does so by referring to the 
well-known Notice of 1998 on Access Agreements, where it is stated that “[g]iven the 
detailed nature of [sector-specific] rules and the fact that they may go beyond the 
requirements of Article [82 EC], undertakings operating in the telecommunications 
sector should be aware that compliance with the Community competition rules does 
not absolve them of their duty to abide by obligations imposed in the [regulatory] 
context, and vice versa”.41 Here DT is about the reverse situation, covered by a mere 
‘vice versa’ in the 1998 Notice; yet the arguments set out in the above excerpt from 
the Notice (greater detail, more extensive requirements) are not reversible. So it 
cannot simply be assumed that because sector-specific regulation can go beyond 
competition law, the reverse is also true. The Notice is somewhat carelessly 
formulated on this point, and the Commission should not have relied upon it. 
 
c. Legal and constitutional factors 
 
A more convincing explanation for applying EC competition law in spite of the false 
positive/double jeopardy rationale put forward by the Supreme Court in Trinko and 
invoked by Deutsche Telekom lies at the constitutional level. It involves a 
fundamental issue of hierarchy of norms. Surprisingly, the Commission did not rely 
upon it in DT. 
 
In the USA, it cannot be denied that the Sherman Act has over the years attained some 
kind of quasi-constitutional status.42 Nevertheless, it is and remains a federal statute. 
As such, it can be affected by other federal statutes.43 Moreover, it can be interpreted 
by the Supreme Court and other courts.44 The interpretation can be quite wide-
ranging: the doctrine of “implied immunity” discussed in Trinko amounts to nothing 
less than a judicial fiat leaving aside the Sherman Act in cases where sector-specific 
regulation is deemed sufficiently complete to fulfill the functions of the Sherman Act. 
As mentioned above, this has been translated into an assumption that sector-specific 
regulation will actually be all-encompassing, so as to cover the functions of 
competition law. The regulated sector is thus entirely handed over to regulation and to 
the regulatory authorities, in the ideal situation where the doctrine of implied 
immunity would apply. 
 
EC competition law takes a special place at the heart of EC law, so much so that it is 
enshrined in the EC Treaty and thus part of “primary EC law”. The key substantive 
provisions of Article 81 and 82 EC are as such beyond the reach of the Community 
institutions, be they acting in a legislative or judicial function. In the absence of 
exceptions in the Treaty itself,45 the ECJ has never allowed any industry, especially a 
regulated one, to claim a complete exception from EC competition law.46 Similarly, 
the Council and the Commission have not used their legislative and executive powers 
to take entire industries out of the realm of EC competition law.47 Because they are 
part of primary EC law, Articles 81 and 82 EC cannot therefore be set aside through 
secondary EC law (legislation adopted on the basis of the Treaty by Community 
institutions) or ECJ case-law. 
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Sector-specific regulation, such as EC electronic communications regulation, is 
secondary EC law. It is adopted on the basis of a number of EC Treaty provisions, 
typically the legal bases concerning the internal market48 or the harmonization of 
national legislation with a view to realizing the internal market.49 As such, it cannot 
thus detract from EC competition law, being primary EC law. At best, sector-specific 
regulation can propose a specific construction of the law which can be influential in 
the interpretation of EC competition law, but it cannot replace or displace EC 
competition law. 
 
Accordingly, when the Commission stated in DT that Article 82 EC remained 
applicable despite all the actions taken by the RegTP under German 
telecommunications law (which was largely based on EC directives), it did not merely 
issue a policy statement, it acknowledged the superior position of EC competition law 
in the basic architecture of EC law. The Commission could not take any other 
position. 
 
The most which a competition authority (be it the Commission, a NCA or a national 
court) could do in the EU is to find that, in a given case, sector-specific regulation has 
been applied in such a way as to achieve the objectives of competition law and thus 
make the application of competition law superfluous. Such a conclusion depends on 
the outcome of sector-specific regulation in a given case, however, and cannot be 
generalized. The mere fact that sector-specific regulation would include provisions 
which, in the words of the Supreme Court, fulfil the “antitrust function” is not enough 
to exclude the application of competition law from the start. 
 
In the end, the different outcome in Trinko and DT regarding the relationship between 
competition law and sector-specific regulation is best explained by basic differences 
in the legal framework. Whereas in US law the Supreme Court could in its ruling 
effectively assume that sector-specific regulation should be taking care of the 
“antitrust function” and that competition law would accordingly be kept outside of 
regulatory disputes, the Commission under EC law could not but conclude that 
competition law remained applicable irrespective of any prior application of sector-
specific regulation. 
 
3. Implications 
 
In the USA, regulation would ideally replace competition law, while in the EU, 
regulation will not displace competition law. Since competition law remains, 
irrespective of regulation, it would follow that regulation should evolve in a way 
which takes into account the presence of competition law. This has a number of 
implications. 
 
A first and more immediate implication is that “regulatory holidays”, which are 
enjoying some popularity as a means to spur investment in infrastructure, are worth 
much less in the EU than in the USA.50 If an EU Member State in its wisdom would 
decide to grant a regulatory holiday to a firm – leaving aside a probable breach of EC 
law51 – it could only remove the threat of regulatory intervention from the NRA 
pursuant to sector-specific legislation. Whilst that might be the most immediate and 
significant threat, competition law remains applicable. Even if the NCA would 
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somehow also be tamed by the Member State in question, the Commission can still 
intervene pursuant to EC competition law. What is more, current EC competition 
policy is to foster the private enforcement of competition law, so that the competitors 
or customers of the firm could seriously disturb its regulatory holiday through 
competition law claims brought before national courts. 
 
Secondly, the constitutional order of the EC implies that sector-specific regulatory 
tasks are left to the Member States in principle. They are carried out under national 
law. That law will either be derived from harmonization instruments based on the 
provisions of the Treaty mentioned above – typically directives whose 
implementation and application are left to Member States52 – or it will be “original” 
national law, in which case it is in any event subject to the EC Treaty. When it comes 
to the application and enforcement of sector-specific regulation, EC directives have 
typically not made any difference between a Community and a national area of 
competence (unlike in the USA where federal and State regulation co-exist).53 On the 
other hand, the Community (through the Commission) has a central role in the 
application and enforcement of EC competition law. Given the overlap between 
competition law and regulation, EC competition law can then be used not only to 
control the behaviour of firms, but also to give a central impulse to the whole of 
economic regulation. As DT also illustrates, EC competition law can even serve 
indirectly to discipline Member States in their regulatory activities. 
 
Thirdly, the persisting applicability of competition law also has implications for 
regulated firms. The policy rationales underlying Trinko, as outlined above, are 
comforting for firms, as they would allow them to concentrate on managing their 
relationship with a sector-specific regulatory authority, which in turn has wide-
ranging powers to tell firms how to conduct their business. In the EC, this is not 
enough: a dominant firm, as the Commission implies in DT, must also ensure that it 
respects competition law. Such a duty could be construed as falling under the broader 
“special responsibility” of the dominant firm under Article 82 EC.54 The latter 
concept is often hard to account for,55 but it is most usefully seen as an indication that 
the dominant firm must take an active role in policing its conduct and cannot simply 
wait for authorities to intervene, if and when authorities would determine that there is 
a reason to intervene. Admittedly it is hard to reconcile such a special responsibility 
with the assumption of profit-maximizing behaviour. Yet involving firms actively in 
the regulatory process also brings advantages.56 The “special responsibility” of the 
dominant firm would therefore imply that it should be pro-active in the regulatory 
process and should not simply hide behind sector-specific authorities when it sees that 
regulatory intervention would result in doubtful outcomes. Nevertheless, this special 
responsibility should not go too far; in DT, the Commission in fact concluded that DT 
should have gone back to the RegTP to ask for a revision of its approved tariffs so as 
to introduce new re-balanced tariffs.57 This seems to be as much as, if not more than, 
one can expect from a regulated firm. 
   
Fourthly, since competition law is always applicable and sector-specific regulation 
should be designed with competition law in mind, regulation is best seen as a 
complement to competition law. The two can be brought under a broader heading of 
“economic regulation”, competition law being the general part, surrounded by specific 
instances of regulation. The EC approach fosters a better integration of economic 
regulation, which can produce positive results as long as public authorities retain the 
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necessary discipline: sector-specific regulation must be designed and assessed in the 
light of competition law, and not the other way around. In other words, regulation 
serves a purpose when it either (i) serves the same objectives as competition law but 
fills gaps in enforcement or (ii) pursues valid policy objectives which are different 
from those of competition law, in a manner which is however as consistent as possible 
with the objectives of competition law.  There is always a risk that competition law 
will rather be loosened up to serve regulatory objectives, and arguably this is 
happening in a number of instances in the EC.58 With the necessary discipline on the 
part of public authorities, the EC approach can result in lighter, more efficient and 
more effective economic regulation. 
 
Fifthly, the EC approach is advantageous from a dynamic perspective. In contrast 
with the US approach, the assumption under the EC approach would rather be that 
regulation is not complete, since it complements competition law. If an examination 
reveals that the application and enforcement of competition law can adequately 
achieve the relevant policy objectives, then there is no need for additional regulation. 
Such an examination can be conducted at regular intervals. In a liberalization process, 
where the aim is to go from a legal monopoly to a competitive market, this means that 
sector-specific regulation will be rolled back over time and perhaps even removed 
altogether. This line of thinking was influential in the design of the new EC electronic 
communications regulatory framework.59 While there are certain specific purposes of 
telecom regulation which are likely to require sector-specific regulation in the longer-
term,60 the amount of regulation can indeed be reduced over time as competition takes 
hold of the sector. However, one can seriously question whether this has been 
happening in practice, given the expansion of regulation in new areas of the electronic 
communications sector since 2002,61 without any countervailing retreat from other 
areas. 
 
II. TECHNOLOGY-NEUTRALITY AND THE PLACE OF COMPETITION LAW IN 
SECTOR-SPECIFIC REGULATION 
 
A. US telecommunications regulation 
 
In the USA, the structure of the Communications Act 1934 (which was not altered by 
the Telecommunications Act 1996) fosters a regulatory approach which rests heavily 
on technological considerations and on definitional issues. Broadly speaking, the Act 
distinguishes between telecommunications services (falling under Title II), radio 
services (including “commercial mobile services” which correspond to mobile 
telecommunications, falling under Title III) and cable services (falling under Title 
VI). The different titles of this Act create different regulatory regimes, and as such it 
is crucial to determine under which of these broadly defined categories a given 
offering falls. Of course, an offering can also fall outside of these definitions and 
therefore escape most if not all regulation under the Communications Act. Witness 
the concept of “enhanced service”, which the FCC introduced in the 1970s in the 
course of the Computer Inquiry, so as to define a category of services which were not 
basic telecommunications services and therefore escaped regulation;62 this outcome 
was subsequently incorporated in the Telecommunications Act 1996 via the concept 
of  “information services”.63 These are but the main concepts: at subsidiary levels in 
the regulatory framework, a large number of other definitions come to bear. 
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The definitions of “telecommunications services”, “commercial mobile services”, 
“cable services” and “information services”, sketched out above, are all based on 
technological considerations. In order to find out where a given offering falls, it is 
therefore necessary to study its technology.64  
 
The application of the US Communications Act therefore involves a definition game: 
the technology behind the offering in question in a given case is analyzed to see under 
which definition the offering falls, and the appropriate consequences are then drawn. 
 
B. EC electronic communications regulation 
 
In contrast, in the course of the review of electronic communications regulation in 
1999-2002, the EC decided to try to make its regulation “technology-neutral”. It is 
still unclear precisely what technology-neutrality entails:65 a weak version of that 
principle would probably not go much beyond a non-discrimination obligation, but a 
stronger version would entail that regulation be as much as possible framed without 
reference to technology. On the basis of the electronic communications regulatory 
framework, it can be argued that the EC chose the stronger version. 
 
This choice is linked to the approach to the relationship between competition law and 
sector-specific regulation outlined previously. Indeed turning away from a 
technology-based system does not obviate the fundamental need to articulate the 
regulatory framework along some basic lines in order to make it operational. 
However, these basic lines are likely to be framed in much more general terms than 
under technology-based regulation, which can afford to be tailor-made for specific 
services. The set of alternative options for these basic lines is limited. Functional 
criteria can be used – such as the control of means of access to users – although if 
overspecified they come close to technology-based regulation. This is why the use of 
economic criteria – market power, presence of network effects – appears both 
desirable and unavoidable if the stronger version of technology-neutrality is to be 
realized in practice. During the legislative process leading up to the new EC electronic 
communications framework, the choice was made to bank on a close relationship with 
competition law and import economics-based concepts taken from classical 
competition law analysis – market definition, market power, a certain set of remedies 
– into regulation, in order (among others) to articulate it along technology-neutral 
lines. The outcome was a much more general regulatory framework than the previous 
one, where a large number of issues were left to further stages of implementation and 
application. 
 
So far, the EC has lived up to the principle of technology-neutrality as the regulatory 
framework was progressively rolled out through derived instruments from the 
Commission and the NRAs. In particular, the first Commission Recommendation on 
relevant markets66 remained relatively true to the ideal of technology-neutrality, 
despite the constraints put on the Commission by the Annex to the Framework 
Directive.67 What is more, with its three criteria for the selection of relevant markets – 
high and persistent barriers to entry, limited prospects for competition behind these 
barriers and relative inefficiency of competition law to police the market – the 
Recommendation actually improved on the generality of the competition law concepts 
introduced in the Framework Directive by focusing on the kind of market problems 
most likely to require sector-specific regulation. 
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To put it crisply, whereas the traditional technology-based approach of US 
telecommunications regulation leads to a definitional exercise to be carried out on an 
offering per offering basis, with an outcome largely determined by the “pigeonhole” 
in which the offering is deemed to fit, the EC aims for a strong version of technology-
neutrality, where the examination of technological characteristics is replaced by an 
analysis based on more general functional/economic concepts, with a more open-
ended outcome. The US approach probably fosters legal certainty, at least once the 
definitional game is over. The EC approach, on the other hand, is liable to be more 
flexible over time, again provided it is applied with sufficient discipline. 
 
C. The challenge of broadband networks and services 
 
It is interesting to see how both approaches are rattled by the current evolution of the 
telecommunications sector, in particular the transition towards broadband networks 
and services.  
 
1. The US answer 
 
In the USA, the FCC came relatively late to the issue, and its first policy statement, at 
the beginning of 2002, showed the consequences of the technology-based approach. 
The FCC was then faced with four separate proceedings concerning: 
(i) the treatment of broadband access over cable: is it a cable service, a 
telecommunications service or something else? (Cable Modems);68 
(ii) the treatment of broadband access offered by the telecom incumbents: is it a 
basic service or an information service? (ILEC Broadband);69 
(iii) the applicability to broadband of unbundling obligations imposed on 
incumbents for narrowband services, so that service-based competition can 
arise on broadband as well (as part of a broader proceeding known as the 
Triennal Review);70 to which the FCC added 
(iv) a general proceeding aiming to bring all these issues under one roof (Wireline 
Broadband).71 
 
The FCC indicated that it would follow the same regulatory principles in all of these 
proceedings:72 
- first, the regulatory authorities must seek to promote the ubiquitous 
availability of broadband-capable infrastructure to all Americans; 
- secondly, ‘broadband’ includes any platform where communications and 
computing converge to provide content requiring broadband capacity (i.e. not 
just cable modem or ADSL technologies); 
- thirdly, the regulatory environment must foster investment and innovation; 
- fourthly, regulation should be rationalized so that harmonized rights and 
obligations are applied to similarly-situated services across different 
technological platforms. 
 
It is apparent from the regulatory principles mentioned above that the FCC intends to 
use its powers to make the US regulatory framework technology-neutral. At the same 
time, the pigeonhole approach described above is difficult to abandon after so many 
decades. To a certain extent, such as approach is mandated by the Communications 
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Act itself, which as said above enshrines separate treatment according to specific 
technological models, and the FCC cannot abandon it. 
 
Accordingly, in these proceedings, distinctions are made between “wireline 
broadband Internet access services”, “cable modem services” and similar services 
provided over other platforms (satellite, terrestrial wireless, power line, etc.).73 
 
In the first proceeding (Cable Modem), the FCC had in 2001 already reached the 
conclusion that “cable modem services” (broadband access offered over cable) 
constituted “information services”.74 That conclusion was challenged before federal 
courts; ultimately, in June 2005, the Supreme Court confirmed the FCC order.75 It is 
interesting to note that the main argument raised against the FCC order was that 
“cable modem services” comprised both “telecommunications services” and 
“information services” and should therefore have been subject also to Title II of the 
Act.76 The Supreme Court was divided on this issue but upheld the reasoning of the 
FCC.77 
 
That Supreme Court judgment prompted the FCC to conclude the second and fourth 
proceedings. In September 2005, the FCC issued an order finding that “wireline 
broadband Internet access services” (broadband access offered over DSL) also fell 
entirely under “information services” and therefore escaped Title II of the Act.78 At 
the same time, the FCC relieved incumbents providing these services from any 
obligations (separation, non-discrimination, provision of special access forms such as 
bitstream, etc.) arising from the Computer Inquiry proceedings. In parallel to the 
order, the FCC also made a policy statement claiming jurisdiction to regulate certain 
aspects of these broadband services under Title I of the Act.79 
 
Finally, the third proceeding has a complex story, since it extended to unbundling 
requirements for both narrowband and broadband services. A first order was issued in 
2003,80 wherein the FCC sought to heed adverse Court decisions and limit the list of 
network elements to be unbundled through a more restrictive interpretation of the 
concepts of “necessity” and “impairment” found in the Communications Act.81 As far 
as broadband was concerned, the FCC concluded that the incumbents should be under 
limited unbundling obligations for Fiber-to-the-Home (FTTH) and hybrid loops. In 
order to reach that conclusion, the FCC referred to § 157 of the Act,82 whereby it has 
the mandate to ensure that “advanced telecommunications capability” is deployed 
throughout the USA. Subsequently, that order was vacated in part by the DC Court of 
Appeal, but the parts concerning broadband were upheld.83 On the strength of the 
latter finding, the FCC then lifted unbundling requirements as well for fiber loops 
serving apartment blocks84 and for Fiber-to-the-Curb (FTTC) deployments.85 Finally, 
using the regulatory forbearance provisions of the Act,86 the incumbents were also 
relieved from incumbent-specific unbundling obligations under § 271 of the Act.87 
 
In the end, all wire-based broadband Internet services – whether provided over cable 
or DSL – were put in the “information services” pigeonhole and thereby subjected to 
light regulation only. Existing regulation was removed. If technological neutrality is 
achieved in the USA, it results thus more from an effort by the FCC to tie together 
those various strands at the implementation level – so that the different technology-
based regimes reach similar outcomes – rather than from the deliberate design of the 
regulatory framework. Indeed, as the previous paragraphs show, a large amount of 
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definitional work is needed and the outcome remains dependent on technology-based 
definitions (“wireline broadband Internet access service”, “cable modem service”, 
etc.). 
 
2. The EC answer 
 
At the same time as the FCC is trying its best to implement some form of technology-
neutrality and move towards the EC approach, the EC is under pressure to abandon 
technology-neutrality when dealing with new developments. For instance, Ofcom has 
opened a consultation on Next Generation Networks (NGNs), which are defined in a 
technology-based fashion and for which Ofcom would like to carve out a specific 
regulatory niche.88 
 
In contrast, the Framework Directive,89 the Commission’s SMP Guidelines90 and the 
ERG Common Position on Remedies91 all rely on the concept of “emerging markets” 
to indicate that new technological developments, whatever they might be, can and 
must be dealt with within the technology-neutral framework. 
 
On the one hand, the new services or networks can constitute separate relevant 
markets, where no SMP is present because of the nascent nature of the market, and 
then no regulation will be applied besides competition law and the non-SMP parts of 
electronic communications regulation. Under certain circumstances, there might be 
leveraging issues which would warrant regulatory attention, but as the ERG suggests, 
any regulatory intervention should then bear on the existing market from which SMP 
could be leveraged onto the emerging market (and not on the emerging market 
directly). 
 
On the other hand, it could also be that the new services or networks do not arise on 
separate relevant markets, as could be the case with Voice over IP (VoIP) if and when 
it develops into a mainstream alternative to the PSTN. In such a situation, there is no 
reason to absolve SMP players from sector-specific regulation simply because they 
are introducing new technologies on existing relevant markets. At the same time, the 
remedies could be adapted to reflect changes in technology. In the longer term, these 
new technologies could contribute to eliminating the market power of incumbents, in 
which case regulatory obligations should be lifted. It might thus be advisable to 
subject markets undergoing technological changes to close scrutiny so as to spot the 
erosion of market power early and not maintain regulation beyond its useful life. 
 
In the end, therefore, the EC would be well-advised to resist the call to exempt “Next 
Generation Networks” or another similarly defined concept from sector-specific 
regulation. While there might be enough academic and research material floating 
around from the USA and UK debates to support such an initiative, it would 
undermine technology-neutrality, one of the most positive elements in the new EC 
electronic communications framework. Furthermore, this would overlook the fact that 
despite all the definitional games which were played in the USA, the FCC is actually 
attempting to move towards technology-neutrality. At the very least, should the EC 
reintroduce a technology-based element in its new framework, it should use it to fence 
off the existing services as opposed to the emerging ones,92 so that technological 
evolution would not be affected by the need to comply with certain definitions. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper illustrates, with two examples, how different (but legitimate) choices of 
legal and regulatory policy can lead to differences in the legal frameworks such that 
the universal applicability of economics might be impaired, or perhaps to put it more 
positively, that it might require further refinement to properly factor in these legal 
differences. 
 
With respect to the relationship between competition law and sector-specific 
regulation, basic constitutional considerations provide the best explanation why US 
and EC law would differ, as evidenced by the contrasting outcomes in the two most 
recent leading cases, Trinko and DT. There are advantages and disadvantages to each 
approach: the US approach might foster legal certainty, while the EC approach might 
be more conducive to the rollback of regulation over time. Accordingly, it is to be 
expected that EC economic regulation might fall short of fulfilling the “antitrust 
function” completely, and that EC competition law would step in. In the light of the 
underlying differences, this cannot immediately be seen as a deficiency of EC law. 
 
Similarly, with respect to technology-neutrality and the place of competition law in 
telecommunications regulation, the USA and the EC follow different routes, which 
here as well can be explained by the different design of the US Communications Act 
and of EC electronic communications regulation. It is interesting to note, however, 
that the FCC appears to be attempting to steer US law in the direction of EC law 
through its policy statements and its interpretation of the Act. At the same time, EC 
policymakers would be well-advised not to abandon their approach and reintroduce 
technology-based regulation. Available economic evidence from the USA (and to 
some extent from the UK as well) should therefore be assessed accordingly. 
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1 In the EC, for example, they constitute “undertakings” within the meaning of Articles 81 and 82 EC, 
since they are engaged in economic activity. The “solidarity” exception carved out in cases such as 
Albany International and AOK does not apply to them. Firms in network industries might fall under 
Article 86(1) (as publicly-owned firms or holders of monopoly rights) or 86(2) (as providers of services 
of general economic interest) EC, but that does not take away from their characterization as 
undertakings.  
2 See Larouche (2005). 
3 We are not necessarily dealing with regulatory competition in the classical sense of the term here, 
since market players have a limited ability to “vote with their feet” to signal their preferred regulatory 
solution. Indeed, once they are committed to doing business in a given jurisdiction, they must comply 
with the regulation in force in that jurisdiction. 
4 Decision 2003/707 of 21 May 2003, Deutsche Telekom AG [2003] OJ L 263/9 [hereinafter DT]. This 
decision is now pending before the Court of First Instance of the European Communities for review.  
5 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 US 682 (2004) [hereinafter 
Trinko]. 
6 The Public Service Commission (PSC) of New York State also intervened to impose additional 
reporting obligations on Verizon. These, and the consent decree, were later on lifted following 
satisfactory compliance. 
7 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300 (1919). 
8 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U. S. 585 (1985). 
9 47 U.S.C. § 152. 
10 Silver v. New York  Stock  Exchange, 373 U. S. 341, 358 (1963) [in original]. 
11 Supra, note 5 at 698. 
12 Regulation 2887/2000 of 18 December 2000 on unbundled access to the local loop [2000] OJ L 
336/4. 
13 Among others; DT was also bound to offer line sharing. 
14 Now the Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA). 
15 ADSL subscriptions were left without any ex ante price regulation scheme, however they were 
subject to regulatory oversight and in fact there had been proceedings concerning the cost-orientation 
of the retail ADSL monthly subscription tariffs. 
16 Directive 90/388 of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecommunications services 
[1990] OJ L 192/10 (as amended by Directive 96/19 of 13 March 1996 [1996] OJ L 74/13), Art. 4c, 3rd 
alinea. See also the discussion in DT, supra, note 4, para. 120-129. 
17 In 2002, the RegTP even introduced a negative X-factor in the RPI-x price-cap formula, to give room 
to DT to increase its tariffs: DT, supra, note 4, Rec. 43. 
18 Key issues were whether to isolate access charges from call charges, and how to account for the 
various retail services (telephony, Internet access, etc.) which could be provided on the basis of a single 
wholesale offering (unbundled local loop). 
19 DT, supra, note 4, para. 59-82. 
20 Ibid., para. 92-95. 
21 Ibid., para. 96-101. 
22 Ibid., para. 102-183. 
23 Ibid., para. 200-212. 
24 Ibid., para. 52. See also para. 104-105. 
25 The Commission relied for that statement on ECJ, 11 November 1997, Joined Cases C-359/95 and 
C-379/95 P Commission v. Ladbroke Racing [1997] ECR I-6225, CFI, 7 October 1999, Case T-228/97, 
Irish Sugar v. Commission [1999] ECR II-296 and CFI, 30 March 2000, Case T-513/93, Consiglio 
Nazionale degli Spedizionieri Doganali [2000] II-1807. 
26 DT, supra, note 4, para. 163-170. 
27 Ibid. at para. 166. 
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28 Ibid. at para. 171-173. DT argued that it could not increase its monthly subscription rate because of 
competitive pressures and political implications, but the Commission did not accept that argument. 
29 Ibid. at para. 174-176. 
30 Ibid. at 212. 
31 Geradin (2004) at 1548-1550 emphasizes this point in explaining the difference between the two 
cases. However, it is not so easy to distinguish between the “efficient” and the “lazy” regulator, so that 
this would not seem to be a reliable criterion on which to decide whether competition law should be 
used once regulatory intervention has taken place. 
32 The RegTP faced severe criticism from the Monopolkommission (Monopolies Commission), which 
is entrusted under § 121(2) of the Telekommunikationsgesetz (Telecommunications Act) of 22 June 
2004 (BGBl.I.1190), as last amended by Art. 3 of the Act of 18 February 2007 (BGBl.I.106) (formerly 
§ 81(3) of the Telekommunikationsgesetz as it was in force at the time of the facts. According to the 
Monopolies Commission, the retail tariffs which the RegTP authorized contained a rebate which 
prevented competition on the market and hence did not comply with § 24(2)2. of the 
Telekommunikationsgesetz as it was in force at the time. Instead, the RegTP should have taken the 
retail tariffs for monthly subscriptions out of the price-cap basket and regulated them individually so as 
to remove the price squeeze: see Monopolkommission (2002) at para. 221 and ff.  
33 It is interesting to ask exactly how the fulfillment of the “antitrust function” is to be assessed. In 
Trinko, the US Supreme Court looked not only at the scheme of telecommunications regulation, but 
also examined the action of the regulatory authorities in the actual case and found it satisfactory. That 
would imply that the fulfillment of the “antitrust function” cannot be assessed on a general basis but 
rather depends on the action of the authority(ies) in a given case. Such a test actually gives an incentive 
to litigate under competition law after regulatory proceedings have been concluded, since in every 
single case a court ruling under competition law would examine whether the regulatory authorities 
correctly did their work from the perspective of competition law. It would seem more consistent with 
the thrust of the reasoning in Trinko to make a more general determination about the adequacy of the 
regulatory scheme, even if this might mean that in some cases the regulatory authorities would be 
allowed to escape with a course of action in the given case that is not entirely satisfactory in the view 
of the court ruling under competition law. 
34 See supra, note 16. The rebalancing obligations of Directive 90/388 were addressed to Germany and 
not to DT as such, since they were part of the measures to be taken while the incumbent still enjoyed 
monopoly rights, in the run-up to liberalization. 
35 It cannot be denied that, in practice, the infringement proceedings would have been a far less 
effective recourse, since it would have resulted in a condemnation against Germany, which would then 
have had to take the necessary steps (presumably via regulatory action) to remove the margin squeeze. 
In comparison, the competition law case againt DT led to a finding directed against DT, which was 
then under intense pressure to change its tariffs as quickly as possible for fear of further litigation 
(including damage claims by competitors). 
36 C.f. Larouche (2000). 
37 It certainly explains why competition law would be seen as a model for regulation: on this see infra, 
Part II. 
38 Indeed the relative ineffectiveness of competition law in comparison to sector-specific regulation is 
one of the three criteria used to select those markets to which sector-specific regulation can potentially 
be applied: see Directive 2002/21 of 7 March 2002 (Framework Directive on electronic 
communications) [2002] OJ L 108/33 at Rec. 27 as well as the Recommendation 2003/311 of 11 
February 2003 on relevant product and service markets within the electronic communications sector 
susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21 [2003] OJ L 114/45 and its 
explanatory memorandum. 
39 The role of courts is likely to increase over time as a consequence of the enactment of Regulation 
1/2003 of 16 December 2002 [2003] OJ L 1/1 and of the developments in case law (in the wake of 
ECJ, 20 September 2001, Case C-456/99, Courage v. Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297) making private 
enforcement of EC competition law more attractive. 
40 Actually, unless there are serious misgivings between the two sets of authorities, the substantive 
overlap means that the Commission and NCAs can actually work in tandem with NRAs, or at least 
expect NRAs to take their cue from the actions of competition law authorities and step in to support 
them at the remedial stage. 
41 Notice of 22 August 1998 on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the 
telecommunications sector [1998] OJ C 265/2 at para. 22. 
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42 The Supreme Court in US v. Toipco Assoc. Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) famously branded the 
Sherman Act “the Magna Charta of free enterprise”. 
43 As is evidenced a contrario by the Telecommunications Act 1996 which expressly provides that the 
Sherman Act remains applicable, as discussed in Trinko itself. 
44 As the majority of the Supreme Court recently restated in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. 
PSKS, Inc. (28 June 2007) not yet reported: see the majority opinion of Kennedy J. under IV. 
45 Within the EC Treaty, exceptions are made only for agriculture at Art. 36 EC. EC competition law 
was made applicable to agriculture, with certain modifications to take into account the common 
agricultural policy, through Regulation 26/62 of 4 April 1962 [1962] OJ 993. Article 86(2) EC allows 
for exceptions to be made for firms entrusted with “services of general economic interest”, but such an 
exception is subject to a number of conditions and designed not to be larger than is necessary. 
46 See the judgments of 14 July 1981, Case 172/80, Züchner v. Bayerische Vereinsbank [1981] ECR 
2021 (banking), 20 March 1985, Case 41/83, Italy v. Commission [1984] ECR 873 
(telecommunications) and 27 January 1987, Case 45/85, Verband der Sachversicherer v. Commission 
[1987] ECR 405 (insurance). 
47 Pursuant to Article 83(2)(c) EC, the Council is empowered to specify how Articles 81 and 82 EC 
apply to certain economic sectors. This power has been used among others to empower the 
Commission to issue a few sectoral block exemptions from Article 81 EC (the only ones remaining 
now concern the insurance sector and car vehicle distribution). 
48 Article 40, 44, 47, 55 EC. 
49 Article 95 EC. 
50 The set of FCC decisions concerning broadband services, as set out infra under heading II.C.1., 
amounts in practice to a regulatory holiday. 
51 The Commission has taken a very hard stance on the German legislative proposal to grant regulatory 
holidays to Deutsche Telekom, opening a fast-track infringement proceeding against Germany. 
According to the press releases, the Commission sees two infringements of EC law. Firstly, the 
German law would breach the objectives of the electronic communications framework, in effectively 
weeding out competition on the higher-speed broadband market (VDSL). Secondly and perhaps more 
importantly, such a legislative action would run counter to the scheme of electronic communications 
regulation, whereby these types of decisions belong to the NRA and not to the executive or the 
legislature, and must be taken only after the notification and comment procedures of the Framework 
Directive have been complied with. See “Commission launches ‘fast track’ infringement proceedings 
against Germany for ‘regulatory holidays’ for Deutsche Telekom”, Press Release IP/07/237 (26 
February 2007), “Telecoms: Commission takes next step in infringement proceedings because of 
Germany's ‘regulatory holiday’ law”, Press Release IP/07/595 (3 May 2007) and “Telecoms: 
Commission to take Germany to Court over its ‘regulatory holiday’ law”, Press Release IP/87/889 (27 
June 2007). 
52 Member States have so far – rightly or wrongly – resisted demands by the industry and others to 
bring the application and enforcement of EC economic regulation (in network industries) at the EC 
level. 
53 The EC regulation of electronic communications, post, energy, among others, is not limited to 
“cross-border” situations, essentially for practical reasons. It would be quasi-impossible to draw the 
line between the internal and cross-border dimensions (given the reliance on integrated networks), and 
furthermore regulation would be made much more complex for little apparent gain. In contrast, it can 
be noted that EC land transport regulation (rail, road) tends to be limited to cross-border transport. 
54 This “special responsibility” is featured in the case-law under Article 82 EC since the judgment of 9 
November 1983, Case 322/81, Michelin v. Commission [1983] ECR 3461, at para. 57. It was invoked 
in DT, supra, note 4 at para. 178. 
55 To some extent it is superfluous, given that the “special responsibility not to allow its conduct to 
impair genuine undistorted competition on the common market” (as stated in Michelin, ibid.) amounts 
in practice to a duty to refrain from abusive conduct and thus comply with Article 82 EC. 
56 Not just for the firm – which can then have more influence on the regulatory process – but also for 
society at large, since this can contribute to reducing the cost of regulation.   
57 Which implied that the access charges went up, as discussed before. A firm, dominant or not, is 
unlikely to raise prices of its own motion in an increasingly competitive environment. This is why 
Member States were put under a duty to ensure that incumbents rebalanced their tariffs ahead of 
liberalization.  
58 See Larouche (2000). 
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59 See statements made by the Commission in Towards a new framework for Electronic 
Communications infrastructure and associated services - The 1999 Communications Review 
COM(1999)539 (10 November 1999) at 49 and the EP Resolution of 13 June 2000 [2001] OJ C 67/53 
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